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Using a panel of Chinese firms over the period 2003-2013, we show that, from the
supply-side perspective, as a result of the implementation of the economic stimulus package
in China, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) received more bank loans and invested more than
non-SOEs. We further find that after the implementation of the economic stimulus package,
bank lending became less responsive to firm profitability and firm investments became less
responsive to investment opportunities for SOEs, non-SOEs from favoured industries and
regions, and non-SOEs with political connections. Overall, our findings support the view that
the stimulus package and the associated increase in bank loan supply in China resulted in
more resources being allocated to SOEs.
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1. Introduction
Major countries that suffered during the recent global financial crisis have launched
economic stimulus packages whose main purpose is to restore economic growth1. Following
Keynesian economic theory, the aim of these economic stimulus packages is to encourage
firms to increase investment behaviour, and thus expansionary monetary policy is usually
implemented by the monetary authority, which results in a significant increase of bank loan
supply in the supply side. However, literature on the effectiveness of the economic stimulus
package and the associated expansionary monetary policy mainly focuses on their effect on
the macro-economy, such as GDP and employment (Cai et al., 2010; Deng et al., 2014); it is
still a controversial issue whether and how the micro-economy is influenced by those
stimulus packages, particularly as there is still no evidence about whether and how bank
lending and firm investment decisions changed following the expansionary monetary policy.
This issue is important because it has been observed that the stimulus package boosted
economic growth, but it is unknown whether the growth is sound and sustainable. One way of
testing this is to examine whether the increased bank loan supply is allocated to different
types of firms fairly and how these firms make their investment decisions following the
implementation of the stimulus package. Compared to mature markets whose stimulus
package is usually market-oriented, with well-designed mechanisms to guarantee its
implementation, the stimulus package in emerging markets may be more governmentoriented, especially in China, where the government still controls a large number of firms and
the banking system, which raises the issue of whether Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) have equal access to the increased bank loan
supply and investment opportunities. The investment decisions made by Chinese firms
following the implementation of the stimulus package, and the excess capacity problem
caused by these investments, have attracted increasing media attention recently2, but there is
still a lack of empirical evidence at the firm level to support this argument. This study aims to
fill this gap by providing fresh evidence on this issue using a sample of Chinese listed firms.
The effectiveness of bank lending through the government-owned banking system has
been widely documented in the literature. Though some studies support the political view by
claiming that the lending behaviour and credit allocation of government lending may be
1

For example, the US government announced a $700 billion stimulus package in 2008 and bailed out
financially distressed financial institutions. The Japanese government announced a first round stimulus package
in 2010 of $915 billion Japanese yen and a second round stimulus package $880 billion Japanese yen in 2012.
Other countries also implemented their respectively stimulus packages, including Germany and France.
2
See http://www.businessinsider.com.au/chinas-excess-capacity-problem-2013-6
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distorted with low efficiency due to political interventions (Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian,
2005; Sapienza, 2004), others argue that government lending can cure market failure and
improve welfare by providing more capital (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011). Empirical
evidence suggests that the beneficial effects of government bank lending can be valuable
during periods of financial crisis (Giannetti and Simonov, 2009; Tong and Wei, 2012; Chen
et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014). All of these studies, though focusing on different aspects,
explicitly mention that the government-owned banking system does have an influence on
bank lending and firm investment activities because the government is able to control the
bank loan supply better under this system.
Meanwhile, another strand of literature has noticed and explored the relevance of bank
loan supply shocks for firms’ financing and investment decisions, which depend on firms’
ability to access external finance. For example, Leary (2009) provides evidence that
following an expansion (contraction) of bank loan supply, the bank loan ratio of small, bankdependent firms significantly increases (decreases) relative to that of large, less bankdependent firms, because small, bank-dependent firms are less likely to switch between
public and private debt markets. Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show that net debt issuances
decline significantly following contraction in the supply of bank credit. Shen et al. (2014)
find that the economic stimulus package in China leads to better access to bank loans for
large and SOEs relative to small and private firms. In addition, existing evidence also shows
that shifts in bank loan supply helps to determine corporate investment, depending on firms’
availability of alternative external finance (Kashyap et al., 1993). Duchin et al. (2010) find
that, faced with tighter monetary policy, which reduces the overall bank loan supply,
investment will be hampered for firms which lack sufficient capital to fund all profitable
investment opportunities, and this is more pronounced for bank-dependent firms. Lemmon
and Roberts (2010) present similar findings that loan supply contraction leads to significant
decline in net investment for below-investment-grade firms.
Though these studies explicitly suggest that expansion (contraction) of bank loan supply
is associated with more (less) bank loan access and corporate investment, the question of
whether and how such bank loan supply shock influences bank lending and corporate
investment decisions in emerging markets remains unknown. The focus of this study,
therefore, is to shed light on this issue to gain an understanding of how bank loan supply
shock, resulting from the Chinese economic stimulus package, influences bank lending and
firm investment decisions.
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The Chinese capital market and credit supply expansion provide an excellent
environment which cannot be replicated in other countries, such as the US, for the following
reasons: first, bank loans in China are almost the only external financing resource for firms,
due to the immature non-bank financing market (Firth et al., 2008; Shen et al., 2014). Thus,
firms in China are more bank-dependent, which makes them much more sensitive to changes
in bank loan supply and enables us to examine the influence of bank loan supply shock with
less concern for endogeneity issues. However, in developed countries such as the US, firms
are able to switch between the public and private debt markets, which makes examination of
the effect of bank loan supply shock more difficult.
Second, the banking system in China is mostly controlled by the government, and that is
why most bank loans for SOEs are secured, based on economic and political considerations
rather than pure commercial judgement. In this sense, relative to non-SOEs, SOEs in China
are more bank-dependent, and thus will be affected more profoundly by changes in bank loan
supply. Therefore, following an expansion of bank loan supply, access to bank loans for
SOEs will increase significantly relative to non-SOEs, regardless of their profitability or
creditworthiness. Once SOEs receive more bank loans, which is related to the stimulus
package, they invest more, under the pressure of political objectives, irrespective of whether
they have profitable investment opportunities or not.
Consistent with our predictions, we find that both SOEs and non-SOEs increase their
bank borrowings significantly following the economic stimulus package. We also find that
the economic stimulus package results in a weaker connection between newly granted bank
loans and firm profitability. Additionally, as more bank loans are available, firms are more
likely to be involved in investment activities and face a weaker relationship between
investment growth and changes in investment opportunities. All the above phenomena are
significant in SOEs but not in non-SOEs. As the change in debt financing may also reflect
firms’ demand for debt, we also follow Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Lemmon and
Roberts (2010) to control for firms’ demand side forces and our findings remain the same.
Our additional analysis further reveals that the influence of the economic stimulus package is
stronger for non-SOEs from government-favoured industries and regions, and for those with
political connections, while the influence of the economic stimulus package is stronger for
SOEs from higher corrupt regions and those controlled by local governments. From the
perspective of lending institutions, we find that government-owned banks (the big five banks
and three policy banks) and joint-equity banks increase their lending significantly, while
foreign banks and non-state owned banks reduce their lending following the economic
4

stimulus package. We also find that the responsiveness of bank lending to firm profitability
becomes weaker for government-owned banks and joint-equity banks following the economic
stimulus package. All our above results are robust to a series of further tests that address the
endogeneity issue or use alternative measurements of key variables.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, as far as we know,
this paper is the first to explore the financial implications of the economic stimulus package
and the associated change in monetary policy for bank lending and firm investment decisions
in an emerging market. We provide evidence that the stimulus package helps the economy
recover from financial tsunami by encouraging banks to lend and firms to invest, but it
weakens the relationship between bank lending and firm profitability, and between firm
investment and investment opportunities. Overall, our results imply that investment by nonSOEs is crowded out by investment by SOEs, which is backed by the government following
the implementation of the stimulus package.
Secondly, we contribute to the literature on the impact of government intervention on
corporate policy. Literature has documented that SOEs usually have advantage in obtaining
bank loans and they invest less efficiently (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Dewenter and
Malatesta, 2001; Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2009;
Chen et al., 2011), while it is also widely documented that politically connected executives
facilitate firms’ accessing of bank loans (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Brandt and Li, 2003;
Cull et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2009; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006).
We complement these studies by using the stimulus package as an exogenous shock, and
revealing a dynamic change of bank loan financing and investment policy in the connected
firms in comparison with non-connected firms when the monetary policy changes.
Thirdly, our study is related to the literature on direct government lending through the
state-owned banking system during the period of the financial crisis. Existing evidence from
an international study suggests that direct capital infusion by government corrects the
inefficiency of credit market freezes (Chen et al., 2014), and thus has a beneficial effect at the
firm level, such as increased stock prices (Tong and Wei, 2012), and more investments
(Giannetti and Simonov, 2009; Lin et al., 2014). Our study shows that, compared to other
types of banks, the lending decisions of state-owned banks are more sensitive to changes of
monetary policy. Our study also complements the literature on the impact of government
ownership on bank lending behaviour. Sapienza (2004) finds that in Italy state-owned banks
favour large firms and firms located in depressed areas, while our study documents that stateowned banks lend primarily to SOEs in China and bank lending is less responsive to firm
5

profitability. We believe that the evidence we present constitutes a useful extension to the
literature, because a government-controlled banking system is a common phenomenon in
emerging markets.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic
stimulus package implemented by the Chinese government and develops our hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the sample and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and
discussions. Section 5 concludes.
2. Background and hypothesis development
2.1 Economic stimulus package in China
The global financial crisis has hit China hard, and induced the slowdown in the domestic
economy in the second half of 2008. In response to the financial crisis, the Chinese
government announced an economic stimulus package of four trillion RMB (about $586
billion), which accounts for 12.5% of total GDP in 2008, spending from the fourth quarter
2008 through to the end of 2010. The stimulus package, which increases investment spending,
was officially announced on 5th November 2008. Of the total four trillion plan, the central
government directly funded 1.18 trillion of the investment, which is 30% of the overall
program, and the rest was funded by local governments and a loosening of monetary policy to
provide bank credit to support investment (Naughton, 2009). In reality, the disbursement of
central government stimulus spending includes the following six tranches: 108 billion in the
fourth quarter of 2008 130 billion, 70 billion, 80 billion and 223.8 billion respectively in the
first to fourth quarters of 2009, and 992.7 billion in 2010. Altogether, the central government
input into to the stimulus totalled 1.6 trillion, which is more than what was planned originally.
Meanwhile, the local governments echoed the central government stimulus program
actively, which accounted for 70 to 75% of budgetary expenditure on fixed investments. In
particular, up to the end of 2008, among 31 administrative regions in China, 24
administrative regions announced investment plans. For example, Yunnan and Liaoning
provinces announced 3 trillion and 1.3 trillion RMB investment plans, respectively. Table 1
summarises the economic stimulus plans announced by 24 local governments immediately
following the economic stimulus package announced by the central government.
Table 1. Economic stimulus plans announced by local governments
Provinces
Announced plan
Provinces
Anhui
389
Jiangsu
Beijing
150
Jilin
Chongqing
1300
Liaoning
Fujian
216.7
Neimenggu
Guangdong
2300
Shandong
Guangxi
200
Shanghai

Announced plan
950
400
1300
160
800
500
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Guizhou
3000
Shaanxi
206
Hainan
207
Shanxi
1000
Hebei
588.9
Sichuan
3000
Henan
1200
Tianjin
1500
Hubei
7000
Yunnan
3000
Hunan
829.2
Zhejiang
350
Source: http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2008-11/24/content_16813059.htm, accessed 24th November
2008. All numbers are in billions RMB.

Table 2 lists detailed information of the investment capital distribution. In Panel A, we
summarise the distribution of the investment capital across priority areas intended by the
central government for both the initial plan and the revised plan. According to the initial plan
that was announced by the head of the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) in late 2008, 45% of total investment would be awarded to transport and power
infrastructure and 9.25% to rural village infrastructure. Later on, in early 2009, the NDRC
revised the economic stimulus plan by reducing the investment in transport and power
infrastructure and environmental investment from 45% to 37.5% and 8.75% to 5.25%,
respectively. The proportion of investments in five other areas has been increased slightly
(see figures in Table 2). In Panel B, we re-summarize the investment capital distribution
across the industries classified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We
find that new investment has been highly concentrated in more favoured industries (i.e.,
priority-areas) including construction, technology and culture while less favoured industries
get very little.
Table 2. Economic stimulus capital disbursement by industries
Initial plan
Revised plan
Disbursement
Percentage
Disbursement
Panel A: Investment distribution by priority-areas announced by NDRC
Transport and Power infrastructure 1800
45%
1500
(railroad, road, airport, electricity
grid)
Rural village infrastructure
370
9.25%
370
Environmental investment
350
8.75%
210
Affordable housing
280
7%
400
Technological innovation
160
4%
370
and structural adjustment
Health and education
40
1%
150
Post-earthquake construction
1000
25%
1000
Total
4000
100%
4000
Panel B: Investment distribution by industry classification according to CSRC
Agriculture
0
0
0
Construction
3450
86.25%
3270
Mining
0
0
0
Manufacture
0
0
0
Public utility
0
0
0
Retailing
0
0
0
Transportation
0
0
0
Technology
160
4%
370
Finance
0
0
0

Percentage
37.5%

9.25%
5.25%
10%
9.25%
3.75%
25%
100%
0
81.75%
0
0
0
0
0
9.25%
0
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Real estate
0
0
0
Public service
0
0
0
Culture
40
1%
150
Conglomerate
350
8.75%
210
Total
4000
100%
4000
Source: Website of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China,
(2009). “Facelift for China’s Economic Stimulus Plan”, 6 th March.
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-03-06/110114405.html. All numbers are in billions RMB.

0
0
3.75%
5.25%
100%
Changyong Wang

2.2 Bank loan supply in China
Though more favoured industries received most government investment as a result of the
stimulus package (see figures in Table 2), bank borrowing and firm investments in less
favoured industries were also influenced by the stimulus package due to the increase of bank
loan supply following the stimulus package. Bank loan supply in China has increased sharply
since the stimulus package was announced for the following reasons: (1) the central
government loosened monetary policy by reducing the benchmark deposit interest rate and
the bank reserve requirements on deposits (the benchmark deposit interest rate and the bank
reserve requirements on deposits were adjusted four times in the second half of 2008,
decreasing from 3.87% to 2.25%, and from 17.5% to 15.5% respectively; They were kept at
this very low level until the fourth quarter of 2010), both measures increase the money supply
in hands of banks; and (2) the announcement of the stimulus package sent a very powerful
signal from the central government to the government-controlled bank system that banks
should try their best to guarantee the growth of the whole economy. And thus Chinese banks,
especially the big five banks, which account for more than 75% of market share in terms of
total deposits in 2008, responded actively by outlining specific policies to support loan
applications, especially applications from the areas emphasised by the central government3.
Joint-equity banks also announced similar policies to loosen bank loan requirements shortly
thereafter in the fourth quarter of 2008, causing the new bank credit to grow by 4.2 trillion
RMB in 2008, and more than double to 9.6 trillion RMB in 2009, and 8 trillion in 2010.
Figure 1 shows that money supply (M2) and bank loan supply have increased significantly
since the fourth quarter of 2008, and this expansionary trend lasts to the fourth quarter of
2013 (the end of our empirical sample). Figure 2 shows that firms’ average bank loan level
suddenly increased from the fourth quarter of 2008. Though it has been reduced slightly since
2011, the average level was still higher than that before the announcement of the economic
stimulus package. This huge increase of bank loan supply has been claimed to have caused a
3

Although, according to the Commercial Bank Law, the ratio of loans to deposits should be less than 75% for
commercial banks, there were still a large gap of 3.7 trillion for the big five banks to reach the 75% cap
(calculation based on the data at the end of November 2008), and governors of the big five banks were all
confident that they would satisfy government requirements about capital infusion.
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number of problems to the whole economy, such as leading to a crowding-out effect over
investment by non-state-owned firms, due to the fact that most of the increased bank loan
supply is allocated to state-owned sectors/firms. However, there is still no empirical evidence
about this type of question. Therefore, this study examines how the increased bank loan
supply shock has influenced bank lending decisions, how the increased bank loan supply is
allocated between SOEs and non-SOEs, and whether firms (SOEs/non-SOEs) managed to
invest the increased funds based on their investment opportunities.
Figure 1. Quarterly data on money supply and bank loan supply (Unit: 100 million RMB)
3500000.00
3000000.00
2500000.00
2000000.00
Money supply (M2)

1500000.00

Bank loan supply
1000000.00
500000.00
2013q3

2012q4

2012q1

2011q2

2010q3

2009q4

2009q1

2008q2

2007q3

2006q4

2006q1

2005q2

2004q3

2003q4

2003q1

0.00

This figure depicts the trends of quarterly money supply and bank loan supply over our sample period. Data
sources: collected and calculated from the website of The People’s Bank of China at:
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/diaochatongjisi/116219/116319/116351/index.html.
Figure 2. The change of firm bank loan level

Firm bank loan change
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2005q1
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2007q3
2008q1
2008q3
2009q1
2009q3
2010q1
2010q3
2011q1
2011q3
2012q1
2012q3
2013q1
2013q3

0.02
0.018
0.016
0.014
0.012
0.01
0.008
0.006
0.004
0.002
0
-0.002
-0.004
-0.006

9

This figure depicts the quarterly change of firm bank loan level of all sample firms in this study. Data sources:
collected and calculated from the CSMAR database.

2.3 Hypothesis development
2.3.1 Economic stimulus package and bank loans
Our first hypothesis relates to the effect of the bank loan supply shock on firms’ debt
financing decisions. Based on the implicit assumption that external capital is infinitely elastic,
a firm’s financing decision is solely determined by a firm’s demand for debt (Modigliani and
Miller, 1958). However, with the presence of capital market frictions, recent evidence argues
that the availability of external finance is a key determinant of a firm’s debt financing
decision (Titman, 2002; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Leary, 2009).
In the Chinese capital market, bank loans are the main source of external finance for
corporations, due to the underdeveloped stock and bond market (Cull and Xu, 2000; Firth et
al., 2008). In this sense, firms in China are mostly bank-dependent and the borrowings of
most firms are supported by bank loans (Firth et al., 2012). Therefore, we expect that the
bank borrowing of Chinese firms is very sensitive to increased government direct lending
through the state-owned banking system, following the implementation of the economic
stimulus package. Economic theories provide two views of how government direct lending
influences the general economy: the Keynesian view and the neoclassical view. Thus we
attempt to answer the question of how government direct lending influences corporate
financing policies based on these two views.
The Keynesian view suggests that the economic stimulus packages through government
direct lending are helpful to the whole economy after the financial tsunami. This is because
commercial banks tend to keep too much precautionary liquidity during the crisis period and
are thus reluctant to lend, which causes market failure. By imposing government direct
lending, the government cures the market failure by providing additional liquidity to the
market and encourages banks to lend (Giannetti and Simonov, 2009; Tong and Wei, 2012;
Chen et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014).
Following our descriptions in Section 2.2, bank loan supply has grown at an explosive
pace since the announcement of the stimulus package by the central government, due to
explicit policies designed to ease provision of credit, which sends a very powerful signal to
banks that they are expected to rapidly ramp up their lending. Therefore, we expect that the
bank loans to Chinese firms (both SOEs and non-SOEs) should increase significantly after
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the implementation of the economic stimulus package and develop our first hypothesis as
follows:
H1a: The economic stimulus package led to more bank loan access for both SOEs and
non-SOEs.
Although the increase in government direct lending may stimulate the economy to
recover from the financial tsunami, the neoclassical view, however, suggests that such direct
government lending may cause long-term inefficiency in the economy because of the
incomplete use of government resources, the so-called ‘Keynesian inefficiency’. One type of
inefficiency caused by increased government direct lending in the Chinese market may be
that the increased resources are primarily allocated to SOEs because the state-owned banks
are inclined to lend to SOEs, following the objectives set by politicians and bureaucrats, to
serve both political and economic goals (Cull and Xu, 2003; Naughton, 2009). Thus, SOEs’
financing policy should be more sensitive to the exogenous shock of bank loan supply, and
we argue that SOEs are more likely to receive more bank loans regardless of their
performance and creditworthiness after the introduction of the economic stimulus package.
However, non-SOEs may be treated differently. As non-SOEs have a short banking
relationship and face severe information asymmetry with state-owned banks, they are
discriminated against in getting bank loans. Existing evidence also suggests that the private
sector survives mainly due to informal financing based on relationships (Allen et al., 2005;
Chen et al., 2013), and banks use commercial judgements when deciding to extend credit to
non-SOEs (Firth et al., 2009). The literature has shown that since the implementation of the
economic stimulus package, most of the funds have been injected into SOEs for investment
and the private sector has contracted (Wong, 2011). Therefore we develop our second
hypothesis as follows:
H1b: After the implementation of the stimulus package, bank loans to SOEs increased
much more than bank loans to non-SOEs.
We further expect that the incentive of banks, especially those state-owned banks, to lend
primarily to SOEs may be enhanced during the financial crisis, when the credit risk is high,
because they believe the government will provide an implicit guarantee for the debts of SOEs,
and this implicit guarantee helps to mitigate the credit risk faced by banks. Therefore, banks
lend the increased capital supply to SOEs without too much consideration about their
profitability after the implementation of the economic stimulus package, and thus we have the
following hypothesis.
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H1c: After the implementation of the stimulus package, bank loans to SOEs became less
responsive to firm profitability.
2.3.2 The economic stimulus package and corporate investment
As discussed above, following the Keynesian economic theory, Chinese firms may be
reluctant to make investments after the financial tsunami because they have strong incentives
to hold cash to avoid the liquidity problem. However, the economic stimulus package and the
associated increased government direct lending may cure the inverse effect of the financial
crisis on corporate investment by enabling firms to obtain more bank loans. Based on this
view, we expect that Chinese firms will increase their investment following the
implementation of the stimulus package.
However, compared to non-SOEs, investment made by SOEs may increase more
following the stimulus package due to the fact that SOEs have better access to financial
resources through increased bank loan supply. Thus we develop the following hypothesis:
H2a: The economic stimulus package boosted investments by both SOEs and non-SOEs.
However, after the implementation of the stimulus package, investments by SOEs increased
much more than investments by non-SOEs.
Given the fact that SOEs receive more bank loans following the implementation of the
economic stimulus package, another related question is whether such a stimulus package
influences firm investment decisions. The aim of the economic stimulus package is to help
the whole economy to recover through boosting corporate investment, so that both central
and local governments spare no effort in urging that bank loans should flow through to the
firm level. For example, the governor of Guangxi province announced that he would
encourage banks to speed up bank loan disbursement (Guangxi Daily, 2009). As a
consequence, bank loans derived from the stimulus package are considered as ‘free’
resources for firms rather than financial obligations, and this relatively easy access to bank
loans encourages firms to engage in suboptimal investments and invest more, no matter
whether their investment opportunities are promising or not. Thus, we conjecture that firm
investment expenditure will be less responsive to its investment opportunities after the
implementation of the stimulus package. Furthermore, relative to non-SOEs, SOEs receive
most of the ‘free’ resources and they are more likely to be influenced by government
intervention to make investments for government objectives (to push the growth rate of the
economy) rather than financial objectives, and are thus more likely to be involved in
investments that are less responsive to investment opportunities. Therefore, we form our
hypothesis as follows:
12

H2b: After the implementation of the stimulus package, SOEs investments became less
responsive to investment opportunities.
2.3.3 The effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment
decisions across industries and regions
We next examine whether the influence of the economic stimulus package on bank
lending and firm investment decisions differs across industries and regions. As we describe in
Section 2.1 above, there are large variations in capital injection across industries and regions.
The composition of investments had been directed toward specific industries that would boost
consumption or have a direct impact on people’s livelihood. As a consequence of government
directions, bank loans and firm investments were mainly focused on industries such as
transport and power infrastructure (railways, roads, airports and the electricity grid), rural
village infrastructure, environment investment, affordable housing, technological innovation
and health and education. Thus, firms from these industries are more likely to receive
government-supported bank loans and in turn involve more investment activities. Moreover,
due to the high degree of politicisation and strong encouragement of bank lending, firms from
these government-favoured industries will receive more bank loans regardless of their
profitability. These firms would also invest more without considering investment potential of
proposed projects (Naughton, 2009).
In addition, along with the announcement of the economic stimulus package by the
central government on the 5th November 2008, many local governments also announced their
own economic stimulus plans to be implemented at the provincial level. In this sense, bank
loan supply shocks may vary across provinces as unequal amounts of bank loans would be
injected by each local government. As outlined above, firms from provinces with larger bank
loans injected will receive more bank loans and invest more. We expect industry and region
should have a stronger influence on bank lending and firm investment decisions for nonSOEs because the government policy may help non-SOEs to overcome institutional barriers.
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: The influence of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm
investment decisions was more significant for firms from industries and regions with more
government-injected capital, especially in non-SOEs.
2.3.4 The effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment
decisions in firms with and without political connections
The above hypotheses have considered the supply side effect on firms’ debt financing,
namely the change in bank loan supply, and how this response varies across industries and
13

regions. However, the variations in firms’ debt financing and investment decisions are also
driven by the firms’ demand side forces, and existing literature documents that many of the
proposed proxies of firm characteristics are correlated with firms’ financial structure and
investment expenditure decisions. Thus, in this section, we try to explore how firms’ demand
side force interacts with the supply side force. In particular, we focus on firms’ political
connections from the demand side perspective. Specifically, an SOE is defined as politically
connected if any CEO or chairman is a current or former officer in the government or the
military (Fan et al., 2007); a non-SOE is defined as politically connected if the CEO,
chairman or largest shareholder is a current or former officer in the government or the
military. In our sample, about 27% of SOEs are politically connected and 36% of non-SOEs.
Evidence from emerging markets suggests that firms have a strong incentive to establish
political connections to seek rents from the government, in the form of more access to bank
loans (Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010). In this sense, political connections are a good
reflection of a firm’s demand for bank loans, all else being equal. Thus, we expect that firms
with political connections are likely to receive more bank loans. However, we are more
concerned about the different effects of political connections between SOEs and non-SOEs.
For SOEs, their banking relationships have already been established because both banks and
firms are owned by the government and SOEs are preferred by state-owned banks in terms of
extending credits (Cull and Xu, 2000). In this case, political connections do not provide
additional benefits for accessing more bank loans. Therefore, the effect of political
connections in SOEs may be diluted by state ownership (Wu et al., 2012). For non-SOEs, the
situation could be different. Due to the weaker bank-firm relationship and more severe
information asymmetry, banks face a higher ex ante cost of collecting non-SOE information
and ex post cost of monitoring, and are less likely to extend credit to the private sector (Firth
et al., 2009). Thus, political connections can help non-SOEs to overcome institutional barriers
to obtain more bank loans (Wu et al., 2012). We thus expect that political connections should
have a stronger influence on bank lending and firm investment decisions for non-SOEs
because political connections in non-SOEs can enhance their ability to obtain bank loans
which can be used for investment. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H4: The influence of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm
investment decisions was stronger for non-SOEs with political connections than those
without.
3. Sample and methodology
3.1 Sample selection
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In this study, quarterly data is applied and firm-level information is obtained from the
Chinese Stock and Market Accounting Research (CSMAR). Our sample starts with all listed
firms on both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the first quarter of 2003 to the
fourth quarter of 2013 4 . Initially, we collected a total population of 64,116 firm-quarter
observations. Following common practice, we deleted 1,311 firm-quarter observations from
the financial industry and 2,256 firm-quarter observations flagged with ST or ST*. We also
excluded 4,342 firm-quarter observations with missing information on the variables that are
used in this study. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level to eliminate the
outlier effects. Our final sample consists of 1,526 firms and 56,207 firm-quarter observations.
3.2 Methodology
Since the economic stimulus package constitutes a nation-wide exogenous shock, we
establish an equation to explain the determinants of bank loan changes in the spirit of
Bertrand et al. (2007). This method allows us to explore the dynamic change in firm
financing policy following the implementation of the stimulus package which is our focus.
We therefore include a dummy variable Stimulus in our model. We also include a dummy
variable SOEs to gain an understanding of the potential difference in bank lending incentives
between SOEs and non-SOEs, and develop the following equation:

BankLoanit   0   1 Stimulus it   2 Stimulus it * SOEsit   3 SOEsit
  4 ROS it 1   5 Qit 1   6 Sizeit   7Tangibilit y it
  8 Political it   9 Board it   10 Indep it   it

(1)

where ∆BankLoan is the change in bank loans (i.e. net newly granted bank loans) in the
current quarter. In the empirical analysis, we look into changes in both total bank loans and
long-term bank loans. Stimulus is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firm-quarter observations
falling in the post-stimulus period and 0 otherwise. SOEs is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs. We test H1a by examining Stimulus and expect the coefficient of
this variable to be significantly positive, and test H1b by examining Stimulus*SOEs and
expect the coefficient of this interaction term to be significantly positive.
Consistent with the literature (Firth et al., 2009; Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we also include
several control variables in equation (1). ROS is return on sales, which is the proxy for firm
profitability. Better performing firms are likely to obtain more bank loans, so the coefficient
is expected to be positive. Q is the value of Tobin’s Q calculated as the ratio of firm market
value to replacement value, which is used as a proxy for firm investment opportunity (Firth et
4

We start our sample in 2003 because new accounting and auditing standards were applied in 2002.
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al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011). As firms with better investment opportunities are likely to
receive more bank loans, we expect a positive coefficient for Q. Size is the natural log of firm
total assets. Since firms with more collateral assets face less difficulty in getting bank loans,
we include Tangibility, defined as the ratio of tangible assets to firm total assets, to control
for collateral information, and we expect a positive coefficient. Political connections are
helpful in accessing bank loans, so we include Political, defined as a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the firm is politically connected, and the coefficient is expected to be positive. We also
include some proxies for corporate governance, which influences bank lending decisions.
These are Board, measured as the log of the total number of directors on the boards, and
Indep, measured as the ratio of independent directors to the total number of directors on the
boards. We also include quarter, industry and province fixed effects. Following previous
studies, we use the one-quarter lag of firm performance and Tobin’s Q in the regression.
We further examine whether the stimulus package has an impact on bank lending
decisions for SOEs and non-SOEs, by estimating the following equation for both the SOE
and non-SOE subsamples, respectively. In accordance with the argument in the literature that
an optimal lending decision is made if a newly granted bank loan is dependent on a firm’s
profitability (Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we use the sensitivity of newly granted bank loans to a
firm’s profitability as the proxy for the bank’s lending decision, where strongly positive
sensitivity indicates an optimal lending decision. The equation is expressed as follows:

BankLoanit   0   1 Stimulus it   2 Stimulus it * ROS it 1   3 ROS it 1   4 Qit 1
  5 Sizeit   6Tangibilit y it   7 Political it   8 Board it
  9 Indep it   it

(2)

In contrast to equation (1), we include one interaction term between Stimulus and ROS to
test H1c, that is, whether a bank’s lending decision is affected by the implementation of the
stimulus package. All the other variables are defined in Table 3.
Regarding firms’ investment decisions, we follow the argument of Bushman et al. (2011)
to relate firm investment growth to changes in investment opportunities (marginal Q). This
method has also been applied by other studies (Zheng and Zhu, 2013), and is expressed as
follows:

Ln( I it / I it 1 )   0   1 Stimulus it   2 Stimulus it * RETit 1   3 RETit 1
  4 Leverageit 1   5 Incomeit   6 Sizeit   7 Saleit 1
  8Tangibilit yit   it

(3)
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where Ln(Iit/Iit-1) is the log of the change in a firm’s investment expenditures in the current
quarter, the proxy for investment growth. We follow Chen et al. (2011) to measure
investment expenditure as the ratio of capital expenditure (cash payments for fixed assets,
intangible assets, and other long-term assets less cash receipts from selling these assets) to
total assets in the current quarter. Prior studies also applied other proxies for investment,
which we consider for the robustness tests 5 . RET measures the change in investment
opportunities (marginal Q), which equals the log of 1 plus lagged industry stock returns. In
particular, the industry stock returns are measured as the average holding period stock return
for all sample firms in a specific industry. We estimate equation (3) for the SOE and nonSOE subsamples. We test H2a by examining Stimulus and expect the coefficient of this
variable to be significantly positive, and test H2b by examining Stimulus*RET and expect the
coefficient to be significantly negative only for SOE subsample.
Following prior studies (Firth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011), we include the following
control variables. Leverage is defined as the proportion of total debt to total assets. Highly
leveraged firms pay more interest and have fewer resources for investments, thus we expect a
negative coefficient for this variable. Income is used to measure internal funds available for
investments, which is measured as the ratio of net income plus depreciation to total assets.
Sale is the net sales scaled by total assets. As larger internal funds provide a firm with more
financial resources for investments, we expect positive coefficients for both Income and Sale.
We also include quarter, industry and province fixed effects.” All other variables are defined
as in Table 3. To remain consistent with the existing literature, we use the one-quarter lag of
leverage and sales level in the regression. Table 3 summarises the definitions of all variables
used in this study for both univariate and multivariate analysis.
Table 3. Variables and definitions
Variable
Definitions
Stimulus
Equals 1 for firm-quarter observations falling in the post-stimulus period, and 0 for
the pre-stimulus period. In particular, pre-stimulus period covers 2003 to the third
quarter of 2008, and post-stimulus period covers the fourth quarter of 2008 to 2013.
∆Totalloan
The change in total bank loans in current quarter
∆Longloan
The change in long-term bank loans in current quarter
Investment (I)
Capital expenditure/Total assets in the current quarter
Ln(I it/I it-1)
The growth of investment expenditure in current quarter
RET
Natural log of 1 plus industry stock return in the current quarter
ROS
Net income/Sales in the current quarter
Leverage
Total debt/Total assets in the current quarter
Income
(Net income + depreciation)/Total assets in the current quarter
Q
Market value/Replacement value in the current quarter
Size
Natural log of total assets in the current quarter

5

These measures include (1) the ratio of change in net fixed assets plus depreciation to total net fixed assets
(Pindado et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012) and (2) net capital expenditure to total assets (Firth et al., 2008).
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Sale
Tangibility
Board
Indep
Political
SOEs

Sales/Total assets in the current quarter
Tangible assets/Total assets in the current quarter
Number of total directors on the boards in the current quarter
Number of independent directors/Total number of directors on board in the current
quarter
Dummy equals 1 for firms with politically connected executives or large
shareholders
Dummy equals 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 for non-state-owned enterprises

4. Empirical results
4.1 Summary statistics and univariate test
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of all variables in this study. From the table, we
observe that the average change in total bank loan ratio is 0.66%, indicating that the bank
loan ratio increased quarterly. We also observe that the mean of investment growth is 0.02
and the quarterly investment expenditure is 1.48% of total assets. Moreover, the change in
investment opportunity is 0.03. The average Tobin’s Q is 1.70 and the median value is 1.32,
and the average internal funds and sales level are 7.78% and 17.91% of total assets
respectively, which are similar to the results by Chen et al. (2011).
Table 4. Summary statistics of all variables
Mean
Median
∆Totalloan (%)
0.66
0.02
∆Longloan (%)
0.25
0
Ln(I it/I it-1)
0.02
0.01
Totalloan (%)
23.96
23.01
Longloan (%)
6.56
2.11
Investment (%)
1.48
0.75
RET
0.03
0.01
ROS (%)
3.91
4.53
Leverage (%)
52.35
51.91
Income (%)
7.78
3.71
Tobin’s Q
1.70
1.32
Size (million)
6,520
2,190
Sale (%)
17.91
14.56
Tangibility (%)
27.39
24.32
Board
9.30
9
Indep (%)
35.79
33.33
Political
0.31
0

25th quartile
-1.08
-0.01
-0.66
9.97
0
0.15
-0.02
0.96
37.24
0.13
1.06
1,040
8.38
13.27
9
33.33
0

75th quartile
2.16
2.36
0.65
35.24
9.60
2.04
0.05
10.92
65.45
16.09
1.86
5,080
23.09
39.28
10
37.50
1

StD
4.98
5.53
1.16
20.59
8.32
2.35
0.26
16.59
0.23
2.20
1.11
4,970
14.07
5.71
2.00
5.51
0.46

Table 5 presents the results of univariate tests, by comparing the change in bank loans
and corporate investment growth before and after the introduction of the economic stimulus
package, for the full sample, SOE and non-SOE subsamples. In Panel A, we compare the
change in bank loans. In the first column for the full sample, we find that the average bank
loan change is higher after the introduction of the economic stimulus package, and the
difference is statistically significant (t-value is -2.10). When we split our total sample into
both SOEs and non-SOEs in columns 2 and 3, we find that this significant difference holds
for SOEs while the difference in non-SOEs is insignificant. In Panel B, we compare the
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growth rate of corporate investment, and we find that the investment growth is significantly
higher for the post-stimulus period, and this difference is also significant for SOEs while
insignificant for non-SOEs. These univariate tests lend primary support to our hypothesis that
compared to non-SOEs, SOEs are able to increase their bank loans and investment
significantly following the bank loan supply shock after the implementation of the stimulus
package. In the last column in Table 5, we further report the difference-in-difference tests of
change in bank loans and investment of SOEs and non-SOEs, and before and after the
introduction of the stimulus package. The statistically and economically significant
difference-in-difference results confirm that after the introduction of the economic stimulus
package, both the increase in total bank loans and investment growth are significantly higher
for SOEs than non-SOEs.
Table 5. Univariate tests before and after the introduction of the economic stimulus package
Full sample
SOEs
Non-SOEs
Difference (t-value)
SOE vs. non-SOE
Panel A: Change in total bank loan ratio
Before
0.59%
0.62%
0.50%
0.12%*(1.81)
After
0.73%
0.82%
0.58%
0.24%**(2.52)
Difference (t-value)
-0.14%**(-2.10)
-0.20%**(-2.46)
-0.08%(-1.10)
-0.12%**(-2.36)
Before vs. After
Panel B: Corporate investment growth
Before
0.012
0.014
0.011
0.003(0.86)
After
0.025
0.038
0.018
0.020***(3.11)
Difference (t-value)
-0.013**(-2.08)
-0.024***(-2.43)
-0.007(-1.19)
-0.017**(-2.23)
Before vs. After
*, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

4.2 Economic stimulus package, bank lending and firm investment decisions
4.2.1 Economic stimulus package and change in bank loans at firm level
In this section, we conduct multivariate analysis in order to provide empirical evidence
regarding how the increase of monetary supply impacts the change in bank loans using the
regression model of equation (1). The results are reported in Table 6. In first two columns, we
apply the change in total bank loans as the dependent variable. We observe from column 1
that the estimated coefficient on Stimulus is positive and significant at the 1% level (t-value is
5.19), indicating that after the introduction of the economic stimulus package the average
quarterly increase of total bank loans is higher than that before the stimulus package. The
results in column 2 show that the coefficient of interaction term Stimulus*SOEs is also
positive and statistically significant, indicating that positive relationship between the
monetary supply shock and change of total bank loans is much stronger in SOEs compared to
non-SOEs. We also observe the coefficients of ROS are positively and significantly related to
the quarterly change of total bank loans. For example, in column 1, the coefficient of ROS is
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0.013. Table 4 shows that the standard deviation for ROS is 0.1659. Hence, a one-standarddeviation increase in ROS yields a 0.22% increase in total bank loan change. As the mean
value for total bank loan change is 0.66%, so a one-standard-deviation increase in ROS
creates 33.3% increase in total bank loan change. In columns 3 and 4, we use the change in
long-term bank loans as the dependent variable to provide additional evidence and similar
results are found, indicating that firms, especially SOEs, are able to obtain more long-term
loans after the introduction of the economic stimulus package. We also find that ROS is also
positively and significantly related to the change of long-term loans. The coefficient of ROS
is 0.005, indicating that a one-standard-deviation increase in ROS creates 33.2% increase in
long-term loan change.
Among the control variables, we observe expected signs consistent with previous studies.
In particular, firms with political connections are able to obtain more bank loans, though this
effect is only significant in the total bank loan regression but insignificant in the long-term
loan regression. The result suggests that firms’ political connections play a more important
role in financing short-term resources than long-term resources. The possible explanation
could be that, in our sample, almost 75% of bank loans are short-term which drives the main
results in the total loan regression (Table 4 shows that the proportion of long-term loan ratio
to total loan ratio is about 25%). In addition, Zhu et al. (2010) argue that firms from more
favoured industries are likely to obtain long-term loans. As we have already controlled for
industry fixed effects, the positive impact of political connections has been diminished.
Overall, these results are consistent with our hypotheses H1a and H1b that both SOEs and
non-SOEs are able to obtain more bank loans following the stimulus package, and relative to
non-SOEs, SOEs’ bank loans increase more significantly. These results suggest that the
stimulus package and the associated increase of bank loan supply result in a more capital
allocation towards SOEs.
Table 6. Effect of the economic stimulus package on the change in bank loans
Dependent variable:
Change in total bank loans
Change in long-term bank loans
1
2
3
4
Stimulus
0.015***
0.013***
0.006***
0.005***
(5.19)
(5.67)
(3.49)
(3.74)
Stimulus*SOEs
0.009**
0.006***
(1.98)
(3.45)
SOEs
0.001*
0.002
(1.82)
(0.55)
ROS
0.013***
0.013**
0.005**
0.005***
(2.98)
(2.90)
(2.43)
(2.40)
Tobin’s Q
0.003***
0.003***
0.002***
0.001***
(7.80)
(7.81)
(2.91)
(2.97)
Size
0.003***
0.003***
0.003***
0.003***
(5.25)
(5.18)
(3.65)
(2.89)
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Tangibility

0.005***
0.005***
0.025***
0.025***
(2.94)
(2.96)
(2.90)
(2.90)
Political
0.001**
0.001**
0.013
0.012
(2.12)
(2.17)
(1.51)
(1.45)
Board
0.001
0.001
0.005
0.005
(0.77)
(0.78)
(0.56)
(0.56)
Indep
0.001
0.001
-0.001
-0.001
(1.01)
(1.01)
(-0.33)
(-0.39)
Constant
-0.017***
-0.019***
-0.495***
-0.481***
(-6.97)
(-6.95)
(-11.06)
(-10.49)
Industry fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Included
Quarter fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Included
Province fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.27
0.28
0.31
0.32
Observations
56207
56207
56207
56207
Columns 1 and 2 report the results using the change in total bank loans as the dependent variable. Columns 3
and 4 report the results using the change in long-term bank loans as the dependent variable. Stimulus is a
dummy variable, equal to 1 for firm-quarter observations falling in the post-stimulus period and 0 otherwise.
SOEs is a dummy variable equal to 1 for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs. ROS is the return on sales. Tobin’s Q is the
ratio of firm market value to replacement value. Size is the log of a firm's total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of
a firm’s tangible assets to total assets. Political is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is politically connected.
Board is the log of the number of total directors on the board. Indep is the ratio of independent directors to total
directors on the board. The T-statistics are in parentheses and computed using the robust standard error clustered
by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

4.2.2 Economic stimulus package and bank lending decisions
In this section, we examine the effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending
decisions by estimating our equation (2), and report the results in Table 7. Consistent with the
results in Table 6, the estimated coefficients on Stimulus are all positive and statistically
significant across three specifications. The interaction term Stimulus*ROS is our main
concern. In the first column for the full sample, we observe that the estimated coefficient on
this interaction term is -0.003 and is significant at the 10% level (t-value is -1.92), indicating
that the connection between change of bank loans and firm profitability becomes weaker after
the introduction of the economic stimulus package. This result indicates that a one-standarddeviation increase in ROS creates 37.7% increase in total bank loan change before the
stimulus package, and 30.2% increase in total bank loan change after the introduction of the
stimulus package. In columns 2 and 3, we partition our total sample into SOEs and non-SOEs.
In column 2 for the SOEs, we find that the coefficient on Stimulus*ROS is also significantly
negative with an even larger magnitude (-0.006 vs. -0.003). This result suggests that banks
are less concerned about SOEs’ profitability when making lending decisions after the
introduction of the stimulus package, which means that the relationship between bank loans
and firm profitability becomes weaker for SOEs after the introduction of the stimulus
package. However, in column 3 for the non-SOEs, this coefficient becomes insignificant,
though negative, indicating that banks’ lending decision towards non-SOEs is not affected
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significantly after the introduction of the stimulus package. The Chow test reveals that
stimulus package has stronger influence on bank lending decision towards SOEs than nonSOEs (F = 4.17, p<0.05). Overall, the results in Table 7 support our hypothesis H1c that more
bank loans were granted to SOEs regardless of their profitability, while non-SOEs have
experienced no significant change. Among the control variables, we observe that political
connection is only effective in obtaining more bank loans in non-SOEs, and other control
variables show coefficients and signs which are consistent with those in Table 6.
Table 7. Effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending decisions
Dependent variable:
Change in total bank loans
Full sample
SOEs
Non-SOEs
Stimulus
0.015***(5.20)
0.020***(4.82)
0.013*(1.78)
Stimulus*ROS
-0.003*(-1.92)
-0.006**(-2.03)
-0.001(-0.43)
ROS
0.015***(8.55)
0.017***(5.62)
0.010***(4.35)
Tobin’s Q
0.003***(7.80)
0.002***(6.15)
0.004***(4.79)
Size
0.009***(8.20)
0.009***(5.88)
0.001***(4.14)
Tangibility
0.005***(3.97)
0.003***(3.72)
0.006***(2.99)
Political
0.001**(2.16)
0.002(0.27)
0.001**(2.10)
Board
0.001(0.66)
0.003**(2.22)
-0.001(-0.94)
Indep
-0.002(-1.01)
-0.002(-0.26)
0.003(0.12)
Constant
-0.024***(-7.68)
-0.031***(-5.45)
-0.016***(-3.23)
Industry fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Quarter fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Province fixed effect
Included
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.26
0.31
0.18
Observations
56207
32450
23757
Chow test
4.17**
The dependent variable is the change in the ratio of total bank loans to total assets. Stimulus is a dummy
variable, equal to 1 for firm-quarter observations falling in the post-stimulus period and 0 otherwise. ROS is the
return on sales. Q is the ratio of firm market value to replacement value. Size is the log of firm total assets.
Tangibility is the ratio of a firm’s tangible assets to total assets. Political is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm is politically connected. Board is the log of number of total directors on the board. Indep is the ratio of
independent directors to total directors on the board. The Chow test reports the significance of the difference in
the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS between SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and
computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

4.2.3 Economic stimulus package and firm investment decisions
In this section, we estimate equation (3) to examine the effect of the economic stimulus
package on firm investment decision, measured as the sensitivity of investment growth to the
change in investment opportunities. Table 8 below shows the estimation results. Across three
specifications, we observe that the estimated coefficients on Stimulus are all positive and
statistically significant, and apparently the investment made by SOEs increase more than
non-SOEs (coefficients are 0.082 and 0.045, respectively). This result is consistent with our
hypothesis H2a and confirms the positive role played by the economic stimulus package
during the global financial crisis period in encouraging firms to invest, and SOEs increase
their investment more significantly than non-SOEs after the introduction of the economic
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stimulus package. We also find that RET has positive and statistically significant coefficients
in three specifications, indicating that investment opportunity is an important determinant of
firm investment regardless of the firm ownership structure. In column 1, the estimated
coefficient of RET suggests that a 10% increase in investment opportunity results in 0.30%
increase in investment growth before the stimulus package. The interaction term
Stimulus*RET is our main concern. In the first column for the full sample, the negative
coefficient on Stimulus*RET is what we expect, suggesting that after the introduction of the
economic stimulus package, though firms increase their investment expenditure significantly,
investment growth becomes less responsive to the change in investment opportunity. In
column 2 for the SOEs, we find that the coefficient on Stimulus*RET is negative and
significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.63), while in column 3 for the non-SOEs, the
coefficient on Stimulus*RET is insignificant. The Chow test reveals that the influence of the
stimulus package is significantly different between SOEs and non-SOEs (F = 7.02, p < 0.01).
Put together, these results support our main hypothesis H2b that firms’ investment
expenditure has a weaker connection with investment opportunities after the implementation
of the stimulus package, which is more pronounced for SOEs than non-SOEs. In addition, the
empirical results of weaker association between investment growth and investment
opportunities for SOEs since the stimulus package are also consistent with anecdotal
observations of overcapacity in some particular industries. For example, at the 2012 China
Iron forum, Mr Wu Xichun, the President of the China Iron and Steel Industry Association
(CISA), claimed that the overproduction in the steel industry was a direct result of the
stimulus package, which led to the loss of firms from this industry, including Bao Gang Gu
Fen (stock code: 600019)6.
Table 8. Effect of the economic stimulus package on firm investment decisions
Dependent variable
Investment growth
Full sample
SOEs
Stimulus
0.062***(5.95)
0.082***(3.30)
Stimulus*RET
-0.027**(-2.25)
-0.032***(-2.63)
RET
0.030***(4.40)
0.024***(3.06)
Leverage
-0.036(-1.22)
-0.022(-0.93)
Income
0.195(0.77)
0.108(0.59)
Size
0.034***(8.14)
0.024***(5.61)
Sale
0.233**(6.19)
0.287***(6.07)
Tangibility
0.089***(4.55)
0.032(1.41)
Constant
0.716***(8.33)
0.532***(5.56)
Industry fixed effect
Included
Included
Quarter fixed effect
Included
Included
Province fixed effect
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.36
0.41

6

Non-SOEs
0.045*(1.78)
-0.020(-0.65)
0.035***(3.18)
-0.098***(-2.18)
0.343(0.68)
0.050***(5.57)
0.196**(2.48)
0.215***(5.02)
1.027*(6.48)
Included
Included
Included
0.38

Source access: http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20120904/110513040308.shtml
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Observations
56207
32450
23757
Chow test
7.02***
The dependent variable is investment growth. Investment expenditure is defined as the ratio of net capital
expenditure to total assets. Stimulus is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for firm-quarter observations falling in the
post-stimulus period and 0 otherwise. RET is measured as the log of 1 plus industry stock return. Leverage is the
ratio of bank loans to total assets. Income is the ratio of internal cash flow to total assets. Size is the log of firm
total assets. Sale is the ratio of sales to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of a firm’s tangible assets to total
assets. The Chow test reports the significance of the difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*RET between
SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and computed using the robust standard error clustered
by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

4.3 Heterogeneity of bank lending and firm investment decisions
Analysis so far has shown that stimulus package affects bank lending and firm
investment decisions which are significant for SOEs. In this section, we move further to
explore cross sectional variations of the effect of the stimulus package on bank lending and
firm investment decisions.
4.3.1 More and less favoured industries
Firms in our sample operate in different industries and we divide these industries into
two groups with different levels of government-injected capital, namely industries more or
less favoured by government. In particular, more favoured industries refer to industries where
stimulus package-related bank loans are injected, including Construction, Technology,
Culture and Conglomerate. Empirically, we re-estimate our main regressions for both
industry groups for SOEs and non-SOEs, and the results are reported in Table 9.
In Panel A of Table 9, we report the estimation of bank lending decision regression.
Across four specifications, we observe that the estimated coefficients on ROS are all positive
and statistically significant, which is consistent with the results from previous tables. As for
the Stimulus variable, we find that the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically
significant for SOEs and non-SOEs from more favoured industries. This is consistent with
our argument that average bank loans increase more significantly for SOEs and non-SOEs
from more favoured industries. An interesting finding is that average bank loans decrease for
non-SOEs from less favoured industries after the introduction of the economic stimulus
package. In particular, the estimated coefficient on Stimulus is -0.027, significant at the 10%
level (t-value is -1.84). The variable of interest to us is Stimulus*ROS. Consistent with our
predictions, bank lending is less responsive to firm profitability after the introduction of the
economic stimulus package, which is more pronounced for SOEs and non-SOEs from more
favoured industries.
Table 9. Effect of the economic stimulus package across industries
SOEs
Non-SOEs
More
favoured Less
favoured More
favoured Less
favoured
industries
industries
industries
industries
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Panel A: Dependent variable is change of bank loans
Stimulus
0.024***(3.65)
0.016***(4.71)
0.017**(2.60)
-0.027*(-1.84)
Stimulus*ROS
-0.009**(-1.97)
-0.006*(-1.68)
-0.002**(-2.18)
-0.002(-0.11)
ROS
0.018**(2.27)
0.017***(5.53)
0.011***(3.52)
0.008**(2.62)
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent
director, industry, quarter and province fixed effects
Adjusted R2
0.26
0.16
0.45
0.24
Observations
10839
21611
7910
15847
Chow test
2.28
4.55**
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth
Stimulus
0.158**(2.49)
0.048***(3.43)
0.077***(2.69)
0.043(1.10)
Stimulus*RET
-0.085***(-2.58)
-0.027***(-2.91)
-0.105*(-1.91)
-0.018(-1.26)
RET
0.003***(3.37)
0.020***(3.07)
0.056*(1.72)
0.027***(3.74)
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and
province fixed effects
Adjusted R2
0.41
0.37
0.37
0.38
Observations
10839
21611
7910
15847
Chow test
0.77
2.89*
This table reports the results of estimation of equation (2) and (3) for SOEs and non-SOEs from more and less
favoured industries. Panels A and B represent bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions
respectively and all the variables are defined as in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the
significance of the difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between firms from
more and less favoured industries for both SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and
computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

In Panel B of Table 9, we report the investment decision estimations. From the results,
we observe that the average investment growth is significantly higher after the introduction of
the economic stimulus package, which is economically significant for SOEs from both more
and less favoured industries (t-values are 2.49 and 3.43 for the Stimulus in columns 1 and 2,
respectively), and significant at the 1% level for non-SOEs only from the more favoured
industries (t-value is 2.69 for Stimulus in column 3), while it is insignificant for non-SOEs
from less favoured industries. Again, the variable of interest is the interaction term
Stimulus*RET. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on this interaction are significantly
negative for SOEs from both more and less favoured industries (columns 1 and 2) and nonSOEs from more favoured industries (column 3), indicating that investment expenditure is
less responsive to investment opportunities after the introduction of the economic stimulus
package for these firms. For non-SOEs from less favoured industries, the estimated
coefficient on Stimulus*RET is insignificant, though negative, indicating that the investment
decision is not affected by the economic stimulus package. Another interesting observation is
that with the implementation of the stimulus package, the average investment growth is
increased for non-SOEs from more favoured industries while insignificant for non-SOEs
from less favoured industries, confirming the argument that non-SOEs contract from the less
favoured industries due to lack of funds.
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4.3.2 More and less favoured regions
In this section, we conduct analysis regarding the influence of the economic stimulus
package across regions. In particular, we divide our sample into two groups. One includes
regions whose stimulus plans are above the median level of the local government stimulus
plans (more favoured regions) and the rest are included in the other group (less favoured
regions). In Section 2.1, we have summarised the stimulus plans for 24 local provincial
governments which explicitly announced the amount of capital injected, while the remaining
seven local governments did not specify the exact amount of capital injected. Thus, to divide
our total sample into two groups of more favoured and less favoured regions, we choose the
15 top-ranked provinces as the more favoured regions and other provinces as the less
favoured regions7. Consistent with the structure in Table 9, we report the estimation results
for both more favoured regions and less favoured regions and for both SOEs and non-SOEs
in Table 10.
Panels A and B present the bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions
respectively. Not surprisingly, we observe that the average increase in total bank loans and
investment growth are significantly higher for SOEs and non-SOEs from more favoured
regions. In addition, the results also show that the relationship between bank loans and firm
profitability and between firm investment expenditures and investment opportunities become
weaker after the introduction of the stimulus package, which are significant for SOEs and
non-SOEs from more favoured regions.
Overall, all of these results based on industrial and regional heterogeneities are consistent
with our main hypothesis H3 that the supply side forces, namely the bank loan supply shock,
shape bank lending behaviour and firm investment policies. Moreover, these effects are
significant for SOEs, and for non-SOEs from more favoured industries and regions.
Table 10. Effect of the economic stimulus package across regions
SOEs
Non-SOEs
More
favoured Less
favoured More
favoured Less
favoured
regions
regions
regions
regions
Panel A: Dependent variable is change of total bank loans
Stimulus
0.015**(2.25)
0.029***(3.24)
0.017*(1.93)
0.011(1.60)
Stimulus*ROS
-0.010**(-2.01)
-0.004**(-2.75)
-0.001**(-2.23)
-0.004(-0.93)
ROS
0.013***(3.63)
0.017***(4.20)
0.012***(3.13)
0.010***(2.58)
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent
director, industry, quarter and province fixed effects
Adjusted R2
0.31
0.24
0.20
0.17
Observations
16225
16225
11878
11879
7

Less favoured regions include those provinces that did not specify the amount of capital invested, as we
conjecture that if the local government wished to infuse a large amount of capital, they would announce it in the
public media. However, we still conduct robustness tests by excluding these provinces and our main results are
quantitatively similar.
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Chow test
0.50
5.02**
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth
Stimulus
0.083***(3.46)
0.034**(2.98)
0.170***(6.30)
0.010(0.56)
Stimulus*RET
-0.043**(-1.98)
-0.017*(-1.72)
-0.052**(-1.98)
-0.013(-0.51)
RET
0.027***(2.16)
0.024**(2.12)
0.048***(2.95)
0.025**(2.65)
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and
province fixed effects
Adjusted R2
0.37
0.41
0.37
0.38
Observations
16225
16225
11878
11879
Chow test
2.55
5.25**
This table reports the results of estimation of equations (2) and (3) for SOEs and non-SOEs from more and less
favoured regions. Panels A and B represent bank lending and firm investment decisions regression respectively
and all the variables are defined as in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the significance
of the difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between firms from more and less
favoured regions for both SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and computed using the
robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.

4.3.3 Firms with and without political connections
In this section, we provide empirical evidence on how bank lending and firm investment
decisions respond to the economic stimulus package for both SOEs and non-SOEs with and
without political connections. The results are reported in Table 11, and panels A and B
present the results of bank lending and firm investment decision regressions. In the first three
columns, we observe that our previous findings hold for SOEs and non-SOEs with political
connections. Overall, our findings from Table 11 confirm our hypothesis H4 that the
influences of the economic stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment decisions
are significant for non-SOEs with political connections, while they do not differ significantly
for SOEs with and without political connections.
Table 11. Effect of the economic stimulus package across firms with and without political connections
SOEs
Non-SOEs
Political
No
political Political
No
political
connections
connections
connections
connections
Panel A: Dependent variable is change of total bank loans
Stimulus
0.035*(1.91)
0.018***(4.36)
0.017**(2.44)
-0.003(-0.28)
Stimulus*ROS
-0.004**(-2.55)
-0.005*(-1.94)
-0.002**(-2.39)
-0.006(-1.04)
ROS
0.015***(2.74)
0.016***(3.43)
0.010***(2.78)
0.018**(2.50)
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, board size, independent director, industry,
quarter and province fixed effects
Adjusted R2
0.18
0.33
0.12
0.26
Observations
8762
23688
8552
15205
Chow test
1.00
4.53**
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth
Stimulus
0.085***(3.67)
0.040**(2.01)
0.095***(4.77)
0.033(1.29)
Stimulus*RET
-0.031**(-2.08)
-0.010**(-2.55)
-0.033*(-1.80)
-0.010(-1.20)
RET
0.030***(3.68)
0.001*(1.85)
0.041***(2.91)
0.007(0.51)
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and
province fixed effects
Adjusted R2
0.35
0.40
0.36
0.41
Observations
8762
23688
8552
15205
Chow test
0.33
3.13*
This table reports the results of estimation of equations (2) and (3) for SOEs and non-SOEs with and without
political connections. Panels A and B represent bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions
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respectively and all the variables are defined as in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the
significance of the difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between firms with
and without political connections for both SOEs and non-SOEs. The T-statistics are in parentheses and
computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

4.4 Additional analysis
In this section, we conduct a set of additional analysis to further support our main
arguments. The first analysis relates to the heterogeneity within SOEs from the points of
views of regional corruption levels and SOE ultimate owner types. The second analysis
focuses on the market reactions towards the announcement of stimulus package. The third
analysis aims to explore the heterogeneity of bank lending decisions based on lender types.
4.4.1 The influence of stimulus package for SOEs in regions with different levels of
corruption and different ultimate owners
Previous analysis has shown that there is no significant variation in government bank
lending towards SOEs. Nevertheless, the influence of stimulus package on SOEs may not be
homogeneous. This subsection aims to provide some additional evidence to examine the
heterogeneity of bank lending and firm investment decisions for SOEs from the perspectives
of regional corruption level and SOE ultimate owner types.
Using a sample of banks from 56 countries, Chen et al. (2014) document that in countries
with low corruption, government bank lending is more efficient, which can improve bank
performance and stabilize the economy during financial crises, while they observe the
opposite phenomenon in countries with high corruption. In their spirit, we exploit the
variations in the level of regional corruption in China to test whether, and to what extent, the
regional corruption levels have an impact on government bank lending towards SOEs. In
particular in regions with high corruption, SOE managers are likely to collude with managers
of state-owned banks, which leads to the pursuit of empire-building and higher agency costs,
due to insufficient monitoring by the state controlling shareholders (Firth et al., 2008). Thus,
it is expected that the influence of the stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment
decisions will be more significant for SOEs located in regions with high corruption.
To conduct the regression analysis, we first construct a corruption index to differentiate
regions of high and low corruption, and assign regions to the high corruption category if their
corruption index is above the median level of the corruption index for a given year8. Then, we

8

To construct the regional corruption index, we collect the following information for each province in each year
during our sample from the China Procuratorial Yearbook. We first count the number of duty crime cases, and
then we count the number of government officials involved in these cases and the total number of government
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divide our sample firms into two groups based on whether they are located in regions of high
or low corruption, and estimate our main regressions for each group. Table 12 reports the
results and our interest is in the interaction terms (Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET).
Consistent with our predictions, we observe that the coefficients of these interaction terms are
more significant and have greater magnitude for SOEs located in the regions of high
corruption. This finding is consistent with the argument of Chen et al. (2014) that government
bank lending is less efficient in areas of high corruption.
Table 12 Effect of the economic stimulus package in regions with high and low corruption (SOE sample)
High corruption regions
Low corruption regions
Panel A: Dependent variable is change of total bank loans
Stimulus
0.016***(3.42)
0.023**(2.16)
Stimulus*ROS
-0.007**(-2.28)
-0.003(-0.60)
ROS
0.015***(4.05)
0.018***(4.23)
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent
director, industry, quarter and province fixed effects.
Adjusted R2
0.38
0.26
Observations
16225
16225
Chow test
5.25**
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth
Stimulus
0.087***(2.87)
0.053***(3.08)
Stimulus*RET
-0.056**(-2.44)
-0.023(-1.23)
RET
0.032**(1.96)
0.023***(2.77)
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and
province fixed effects.
Adjusted R2
0.38
0.38
Observations
16225
16225
Chow test
4.01**
This table reports the results of estimation of equations (2) and (3) for SOEs from high and low corruption
regions. Panels A and B represent bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions respectively and all
the variables are defined as in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the significance of the
difference in the coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between firms from high and low
corruption regions. The T-statistics are in parentheses and computed using the robust standard error clustered by
firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

In addition, the ultimate owner of SOEs can be either the central government or a local
government, which may also alter the influence of stimulus package, because the central
government and local governments have different objectives for retaining ownership in SOEs.
Specifically, in the case of central SOEs, the aim is to maintain control over key industries
and guarantee the safety of the national economy, while in case of local SOEs, the aim is to
increase local GDP and reduce local unemployment (Jin et al., 2005). Wu et al. (2012) argue
that compared with central SOEs, local SOEs are subject to severe government intervention.
Wang et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence to support the argument
that central SOEs and local SOEs have different incentives. In the light of this, we repeat the

officials. Then, we calculate the corruption index as the ratio of corrupt officials to total officials for each
province in each year.
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above analysis for both central and local SOEs to investigate whether the influence of the
stimulus package is different for each of these two groups of firms. The results reported in
Table 13 show that our previous findings for SOEs are mainly driven by local SOEs,
reflected by significant interaction terms in both panels, indicating that the stimulus package
influences the bank lending and firm investment decisions of local SOEs relative to central
SOEs. This finding is consistent with the previous argument that local SOEs are subject to
more severe government intervention.
Table 13 Effect of the economic stimulus package in central SOEs and local SOEs
Central SOEs
Local SOEs
Panel A: Dependent variable is change of total bank loans
Stimulus
0.014***(4.17)
0.025***(7.62)
Stimulus*ROS
-0.007(-1.07)
-0.004**(-2.38)
ROS
0.019***(3.52)
0.008**(2.84)
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent
director, industry, quarter and province fixed effects.
Adjusted R2
0.27
0.26
Observations
11799
20651
Chow test
4.77**
Panel B: Dependent variable is investment growth
Stimulus
0.085***(5.05)
0.048***(5.66)
Stimulus*RET
-0.061*(-1.90)
-0.024**(-2.17)
RET
0.033*(1.89)
0.022***(3.18)
Control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales growth, tangible assets, industry, quarter and
province fixed effects.
Adjusted R2
0.41
0.39
Observations
11799
20651
Chow test
2.93*
This table reports the results of estimation of equations (2) and (3) for central SOEs and local SOEs. Panels A
and B represent both bank lending and firm investment decisions regressions and all the variables are defined as
in previous tables. In Panels A and B, the Chow tests report the significance of the difference in the coefficients
on the Stimulus*ROS and Stimulus*RET between central SOEs and local SOEs. The T-statistics are in
parentheses and computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the
significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

4.4.2 Market reaction to the announcement of the economic stimulus package
Analyses so far have shown that, from the firms’ perspective, the influence of the
stimulus package varies according to the ownership structure and institutional environment.
In this section, we examine the influence of the stimulus package from the investors’
perspective. The purpose of this examination is to see whether investors in the secondary
market are able to identify the value implications of the stimulus package announcement. If
the stimulus package is likely to influence bank lending and firm investment decisions as we
documented before, investors will discount this announcement. Specifically, the
announcement effect is measured by the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
around the announcement using the market-adjusted excess return model. We choose two
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days in the event window (0, +1), and 230 days as the estimation window (-240, -10). Our
CAR calculation is consistent with the method applied by Huang et al. (2012).
Empirically, we regress CARs against ownership structure and institutional environment
proxies and report the results in Table 14. All independent variables are from the quarter
before the announcement, following Huang et al. (2012). In column 1, the coefficient of SOE
is -0.007 and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -1.97), indicating that
investors feel pessimistic about the stimulus package for SOEs, which is consistent with our
previous findings for SOEs. Columns 2 to 4 report the investor reaction for both SOEs and
non-SOEs from different industries or different institutional environments and the results are
consistent with our findings in the above subsections. For example in column 2, the
coefficient of Favoured industry dummy is -0.010 and significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.17). This result indicates that for non-SOEs from more favoured industries (when the SOE
dummy equals 0, the coefficient of Favoured industry dummy represents the market reaction
to non-SOEs from favoured industries), the stock price within the first day window is 1%
lower than for those non-SOEs from less favoured industries, consistent with our previous
findings in Table 9 that the stimulus package influences bank lending and firm investment
decisions for non-SOEs from more favoured industries. Overall, the results from the event
study are consistent with our previous findings and support our hypotheses.
Table 14 Effects of ownership and institutional environment on CARs around stimulus package
announcement
Dependent variable is the two-day CARs around stimulus package announcement
SOE
-0.007**
-0.007**
-0.009*
-0.007*
(-1.97)
(-2.05)
(-1.83)
(-1.93)
SOE*Favoured industry dummy
-0.007
(-0.47)
SOE*Favoured region dummy
-0.007
(-1.31)
SOE*Political connection dummy
-0.002
(-0.28)
Favoured industry dummy
-0.010**
(-2.17)
Favoured region dummy
-0.015***
(-3.03)
Political connection dummy
-0.005*
(-1.73)
Control variables included in the regressions are return on sales, Tobin’s Q, leverage, income, tangible assets,
board size and independent director ratio.
Adjusted R2
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.04
Observations
1297
1297
1297
1297
This table reports the results of the market reaction to the announcement of the stimulus package for firms with
different ownership structure from different industries or institutional environments. The dependent variable is
the two-day CARs around the announcement of the stimulus package. The T-statistics are in parentheses and
computed using the robust standard error clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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4.4.3 The influence of stimulus package based on lender types
In this section, we divide banks into different groups and examine how bank ownership
heterogeneities affect their lending decisions. In particular, we divide all banks that extend
credit to our sample firms into the following four groups, namely, government-owned banks
(this group includes the big five banks and three policy banks), city commercial banks, jointequity banks (this group includes joint-equity commercial banks and their affiliated
institutions), and non-state owned bank (this group includes foreign banks and other non-state
owned joint-equity banks). Two classifications need to be noticed. First, the Communication
Bank is categorized as one of big five government-owned banks. Second, four joint-equity
banks (Minsheng bank, Pingan bank, Zheshang bank and Hengfeng banks) are classified as
non-state owned banks due to their largest shareholder is not the Chinese government, though
the nomination of Chairman needs to be approved by the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (see Appendix 1 for the guideline of our classification). Then we estimate our
main regression for each group and report the results in Table 15. In this analysis, we apply
the bank loan level data for regression estimation. Initially, we are able to collect 2,531 bank
loans. Then we delete 83 loans with missing information on the loans, 408 loans due to
unclassified bank types, and finally have 2,040 loans for analysis.
From Table 15, we observe that the average newly granted bank loans becomes
significantly larger after the introduction of the economic stimulus package for governmentowned bank and joint-equity bank groups, while significantly smaller for non-state owned
bank group. This result is consistent with the evidence from developed markets that private
bank lending decreases significantly during the financial crisis period (Leary, 2009; Lemmon
and Roberts, 2010; Lin et al., 2014). These results confirm our previous argument that direct
government lending is implemented through the state-owned banking system, while other
creditor lending declines. We also observe that the estimated coefficients of ROS are only
statistically significant in the city commercial banks and non-state owned banks groups,
indicating that commercial judgement is only applied by city commercial banks and non-state
owned banks. Most importantly, we find that the interaction terms show significantly
negative coefficients for government-owned bank and joint-equity bank groups, suggesting
that lending decisions of government owned banks and joint-equity banks have been
significantly influenced by the economic stimulus package. In addition, the bank lending
decision is enhanced for non-state owned banks, reflected by a positive though insignificant
estimated coefficient on the Stimulus*ROS term.
Table 15 Effect of the economic stimulus package on bank lending decisions by bank types
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Dependent variable

Newly granted bank loans scaled by total assets
1.Government
2.City
commercial 3.Joint-equity banks
4.Non-state
owned banks
banks
owned banks
Stimulus
0.031***
-0.008
0.005*
-0.033***
(2.89)
(-1.05)
(1.94)
(-2.60)
Stimulus*ROS
-0.018***
-0.025
-0.080***
0.068
(-2.63)
(-0.80)
(-2.86)
(1.44)
ROS
-0.031
0.034**
0.010
0.026**
(-1.19)
(2.43)
(0.78)
(1.98)
Control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent
director ratio, industry and year fixed effects
Adjusted R2
0.16
0.09
0.19
0.25
Observation
1105
177
518
240
Chow test
1 vs 2
1 vs 3
1 vs 4
2 vs 3
2 vs 4
3 vs 4
5.13**
0.86
5.78**
5.66**
1.60
6.65***
This table reports the results of bank lending decisions using bank loan level data by dividing our total sample
into four groups based on lending institutions. The Chow test reports the significance of the difference in the
coefficients on the Stimulus*ROS between each pairs of sub-samples. T-statistics are in parentheses and
computed using the robust standard error clustered by the firm. *, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.

4.5 Robustness tests
4.5.1 Endogeneity
One concern about our results on the influence of the stimulus package on bank lending
decisions and firm investment efficiencies is endogeneity, due to endogenous regressors and
unobserved heterogeneities. For example, in our bank lending decision model, firm
profitability is likely to be determined by other independent variables, so that it is
endogenously determined. In addition in our investment decision model, investment
opportunities are also likely to be correlated with leverage. To address the endogeneity of
regressors, we apply the first-difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as an
alternative to check the robustness of our results. The use of GMM can also account for
unobserved heterogeneity and time-invariant firm characteristics, as developed by Arellano
and Bond (1991). To apply this method, we first add a one period lag of dependent variable
on the right hand to account for any possible dynamic endogeneity (Arellano and Bond,
1991). Then, we assume all our independent variables, except quarter dummies, are
potentially endogenous, which means that there may be some forms of persistence in our
independent variables such as ROS and RET. Thus we use two and three period lags of all
potential endogenous independent variables as instruments in our regression models.
Table 16 reports the estimation results of both bank lending and firm investment
decisions equations. As we use the differenced GMM with the lagged dependent variables as
the explanatory variables, it is noted that the observations of both equations are smaller than
the full sample. In addition, as we use different independent variables in both equations, the
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observations for both regressions are slightly different. The signs of estimated coefficients of
our key variables are the same as those in previous tables, which confirms the robustness of
our main findings. In addition, we observe that, after controlling for the potential endogeneity
of all regressors, the magnitudes of coefficients are even larger. The Hansen tests (p-values)
are both larger than 0.1, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that instrumental
variables are exogenous. We also report the first and second-order auto-correlation tests.
These results suggest that residuals are correlated at the first order but not at the second order.
Table 16 Bank lending and firm investment decisions equations (GMM estimation)
Bank lending decisions equation
Firm investment decisions equation
Stimulus
0.605***(2.66)
0.218**(2.42)
Stimulus*ROS
-0.117***(-2.65)
ROS
0.114***(4.47)
Stimulus*RET
-0.386***(-2.61)
RET
0.107**(2.27)
Lagged dependent variable and other control variables in equation (2) and (3) are also included in each
regression.
Hansen test (p-value)
0.46
0.58
AR (1) (p-value)
0.00
0.01
AR (2) (p-value)
0.74
0.81
Observations
51437
52240
This table reports the estimation results of our equation (2) and (3) using the first-difference GMM. The Tstatistics are in parentheses and computed using the two-step robust, firm-clustered standard error by
incorporating the small-sample correction; ** and *** indicate the significance levels at the 5% and 1%,
respectively.

4.5.2 Other robustness tests
To complement previous analysis from firms’ perspective, we conduct event study to
examine the influence of stimulus package on bank lending and firm investment decisions
from investors’ perspective. To do so, we compare the CARs for bank loans and mergers and
acquisitions announcements before and after the implementation of stimulus package. The
unreported results show that CARs for bank loans and mergers and acquisitions
announcements are significantly lower for SOEs after the introduction of the stimulus
package, which is consistent with our previous arguments.
In the prior analysis we have used the Stimulus dummy variable to indicate the economic
stimulus package period. One concern is that it may be a bit too noisy because it may also
incorporate information other than the government stimulus package implemented in China.
Moreover, using the dummy variable can only reflect the static process, which ignores the
dynamic trend. In this sense, we create an alternative proxy for the economic stimulus
package policy, which is a continuous variable defined as the ratio of quarterly change in
bank loan supply to the bank loan supply of the last quarter.
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Our next robustness test relates to the identification of bank loan supply expansion
periods. Shen et al. (2014) define the period between the fourth quarter of 2008 and fourth
quarter of 2010 as the capital expansion period. In their spirit, we conduct two additional
regression analysis by (1) re-defining Stimulus dummy to be consistent with Shen et al.
(2014), and (2) deleting the period between the fourth quarter of 2008 and fourth quarter of
2010 from our sample.
We further conduct robustness check by applying alternative measurement of investment
opportunities in our bank loan equations (1) and (2). As argued by Almeida and Campello
(2007), the information about investment opportunities is captured by other variables such as
cash flows if the firm is seen as financially constrained, and in this sense Tobin’s Q is a
comparatively poorer proxy for investment opportunities9. To address this concern, we use
the growth rate of sales level as an alternative proxy for investment opportunities following
Nash et al. (2003), and re-estimate our bank loan equations. Additionally, we also repeat the
bank loan equation estimation using the bank loan level data for robustness check. All of
above robustness test results remain quantitatively similar to the main results reported in
previous tables, which confirm that our main findings are robust for alternative measurements.
To save the space, we do not report the results of this section but they are available on request.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of how the supply-side shock of bank loans affects bank
lending and firm investment decisions. The implementation of the Chinese economic
stimulus package and the related expansion of bank loan supply are used as a laboratory to
test our hypotheses. Primarily, we find that the implementation of the stimulus package after
the financial tsunami enables both SOEs and non-SOEs to gain better access to bank loans
and encourage them to make more investment, which is helpful for economic recovery.
However, the economic stimulus package results in weaker relationships between bank loans
and firm profitability and between investment expenditure and investment opportunities,
especially in local SOEs, SOEs from high corruption regions, non-SOEs from more favoured
industries and regions, and non-SOEs with political connections. Our main findings are
robust to corrections for endogeneity and alternative measurements.
Overall, our findings suggest that, contrary to developed countries such as Japan, where
government direct lending effectively corrects the inefficiency of credit market freezes and
has a beneficial effect at the firm level (Lin et al., 2014), the increased bank loan supply and

9

We appreciate the associate editor’s comment for pointing out this issue.
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government lending in China, where the government owns SOEs as well as a majority of
banks, are mainly allocated to SOEs rather than non-SOEs. Moreover, SOE investments are
less related to investment opportunities because newly granted loans are less connected with
firm profitability. This being the case, we reveal the economic consequence of stimulus
packages in emerging markets.

Appendix 1. Classification of bank types
Government-owned banks

City commercial banks

Joint-equity banks

Non-state owned banks

These include Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China
Construction Bank, Agriculture Bank of China, Bank of China,
Communication Bank, Agricultural Development Bank of China (1994),
The Export-Import Bank of China (1994), China Development Bank
(1994).
These include 136 commercial banks at city levels. The top 10 city
commercial banks include Shanghai Bank, Jiangsu Bank, Beijing
Agriculture Commercial Bank, Chongqing Agriculture Commercial Bank,
Shanghai Agriculture Commercial Bank, Nanjing Bank, Guangzhou
Agriculture Commercial Bank, Ningbo Bank, Hongzhou Bank, and Tianjin
Bank.
These include China Merchants Bank (1988), China Citic Bank (1988),
China Everbright Bank (1992), Huaxia Bank (1992), Industrial Bank
(1988), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (1992), China Guangfa Bank
(1988), Bohai Bank (2005).
These include foreign banks operating on the mainland of China and nonstate owned banks whose largest shareholder is not Chinese government.
Which include Beijing Bank and four joint-equity banks (Minsheng bank,
Pingan bank, Zheshang bank and Hengfeng banks).

Figures in brackets are the year of the establishment of banks.
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